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Abstract 
Regulatory bodies and performance management systems have proliferated in recent years in 
UK public services.  Furthermore, as the shortcomings of one body or system are revealed, 
the preferred solution is frequently to replace them with new versions.  This approach is 
costly and often does not seem to solve the problems it seeks to address.  Indeed the result 
can be confusion and diminished performance at least in the short term as new people try to 
get to grips with the problems that their predecessors failed to solve.  The new approaches 
have tried to replace trust in professionalism of individuals with monitoring of formalised 
performance measures, in an effort to improve economy, efficiency and effectiveness.  As is 
well-documented in the literature, the focus tends to be on the first two of these, as the third is 
notoriously difficult to measure.  Examples abound of the dysfunctional consequences in 
health and education, to name but two areas of public services, as organisations strive to 
‘meet the target’, but unfortunately ‘miss the point’. 
This paper will review relevant literature and publicly available documents on regulatory and 
performance management practices in UK public services in recent years, with a particular 
focus on the English National Health Service (NHS).  It will investigate the changes that have 
occurred as new regulatory bodies and performance management systems have come to 
replace old ones, including the cost implications and outcomes of these changes.  Drawing on 
the evidence of the recently-concluded public inquiry into events at Mid-Staffordshire NHS 
Trust (www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com), where it is believed hundreds of patients may have 
died needlessly as the organisation struggled to achieve a particular performance target 
(maximum four hour waiting time for patients arriving at hospital Accident and Emergency 
departments), the study will discuss not only performance management issues, but also the 
broader concerns raised regarding regulatory bodies and their fitness for purpose.  It will also 
consider the future for healthcare in England, with a discussion of the latest developments in 
appointing Monitor as an economic regulator tasked with extending competition in the sector.   
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The quest for effective regulation and performance management in UK 
public services 
 
1. Introduction 
Regulatory bodies and performance management systems (PMS) have proliferated in recent 
years in UK public services.  Furthermore, as the shortcomings of one body or system are 
revealed, the preferred solution is frequently to replace them with new versions.  This 
approach is costly and often does not seem to solve the problems it seeks to address.  Indeed 
the result can be confusion and diminished performance at least in the short term as new 
people try to get to grips with the problems that their predecessors failed to solve.  The new 
approaches have tried to replace trust in professionalism of individuals with monitoring of 
formalised performance measures, in an effort to improve economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness.  As is well-documented in the literature, the focus tends to be on the first two 
of these, as the third is notoriously difficult to measure.  Examples abound of the 
dysfunctional consequences in health and education, to name but two areas of public services, 
as organisations strive to ‘meet the target’, but unfortunately ‘miss the point’.   Regulation 
and performance management systems are devised and implemented in a top-down manner, 
and this paper argues that one consequence of this approach is an over-emphasis on the 
expected efficacy of surveillance and a neglect of the crucial role of agency.  In the current 
era of financial crisis and consequent shrinking of resources available for public services, 
opportunities should be sought to channel more to front-line services and less to (often 
ineffective and counter-productive) ever-changing regulatory mechanisms. 
  
2. Prior research 
There is a body which of research which investigates performance management in the NHS. 
In the UK, performance management in the public sector is based on an ongoing monitoring 
of quantitative performance indicators that have proliferated rapidly (Hood, 1991, 1995).   
Targets in the UK are supposed to achieve better value for money and accountability through 
public scrutiny.  Regulation by targets assumes that priorities can be targeted, that the areas 
measured are representative of the whole, and that what is excluded does not matter.  
Centrally determined top-down implementation of organisational performance targets can 
trigger distortions in behaviour, as employees or organisations modify their actions to 
improve performance indicators chosen (often based on their ease of measurement rather than 
importance).  Hood (2006) identifies the dangers of ‘gaming’ behaviour associated with such 
metrics in public services. Problems arising from gaming mean that even when reported 
performance meets targets, there is no assurance that desired performance has been achieved. 
Undesirable and hidden consequences include: areas not subject to performance measurement 
may have been neglected in order to focus on those subject to targets; unintended actions may 
have been taken to meet the targets (‘hitting the target and missing the point’); data may have 
been falsified (Bevan and Hood, 2006).  A set of strategic performance measures is usually 
suggested as the solution, but would require that some of the less traditional, more qualitative 
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aspects of performance be accounted for, and the difficulties of doing so are often the reason 
for more instrumental targets being devised in the first place.  
 
A number of recent studies on performance measurement and management in health services 
illustrate the problems associated with an instrumental approach to design of new 
performance management systems.  Studies which have focussed on financial aspects of 
performance measurement in the NHS include those by Northcott and Llewellyn (2003), who 
criticise the calculation of average costs in health services in England, and direct attention to 
causes of inconsistencies which adversely affected effective benchmarking comparisons. 
Subsequently they examine the influence of these practices on cost comparisons, concluding 
that processes of hospital life “become average” as they are transformed to comply with the 
cost accounting average (Llewellyn and Northcott, 2004). 
Failure to provide evidence of an integrated and balanced approach to measuring cost and 
quality in health services, as reported in previous studies (Jones, 2002; Guven Uslu, 2005; 
Guven Uslu and Conrad, 2008) further illustrate the adverse impact on the overall concept of 
performance management and its understanding and implementation in the NHS. Other 
studies explain the impact of power relations between professionals, as new costing systems 
provided more visibility to organisational activities (Conrad and Guven Uslu, 2011; 
Llewellyn and Northcott, 2005; Chua, 1995). 
One recent study contributed to the performance management debate by providing 
longitudinal empirical evidence on the ‘process of change’ in health services, where new 
financial and non-financial performance metrics had the potential to facilitate communication 
and collaboration between clinicians, managers and accountants (Guven Uslu and Conrad, 
2011).  The increasing importance of accurate coding of medical activity for purposes of 
income management was considered to have a direct influence on the need for, and provide a 
catalyst for, improved communication between professional groups.    
Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) discuss the importance of understanding the distinctive 
conditions that apply where a PMS is being designed for use by one organisation to regulate 
‘at a distance’ the activities of another organisation in the public sector. Their analysis leads 
to the conceptualisation of a ‘middle range’ (Laughlin, 1995, 2004) model of the alternative 
nature of PMSs, lying on a continuum from a ‘transactional’ ideal type at one end to a 
‘relational’ ideal type at the other, built on respectively underlying instrumental and 
communicative rationalities, and guided by a range of contextual factors.  In the former 
approach performance indicators are likely to be primarily calculation-oriented, while in the 
latter are more likely to be values-oriented.  They suggest that the likelihood of participants 
taking ownership of the ends and means of the PMS are likely to be low for a ‘transactional’ 
approach and high for a ‘relational’ approach.   
There is a little academic literature on the developments in regulatory bodies and their 
accountabilities in the NHS. This paper will review relevant literature and publicly available 
documents on regulatory and performance management practices in UK public services in 
recent years, with a particular focus on the English National Health Service (NHS).  It will 
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investigate the changes that have occurred as new regulatory bodies and performance 
management systems have come to replace old ones, including the cost implications and 
outcomes of these changes.  Drawing on the evidence of the recently-concluded public 
inquiry into events at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Trust (www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com), 
where it is believed hundreds of patients may have died needlessly as the organisation 
struggled to achieve a particular performance target (maximum four hour waiting time for 
patients arriving at hospital Accident and Emergency departments), the study will discuss not 
only performance management issues, but also the broader concerns raised regarding 
regulatory bodies and their fitness for purpose.    
 
3. Theoretical framework 
The analysis in this paper is informed by the theoretical framework developed by Dillard et al 
(2004).  This framework recognises the political nature of institutional change, and alerts us 
to the value of considering three levels in the analysis: the institutional level, the 
organisational field level and the organisational level. It draws on the work of Weber (Weber, 
1968).  Weber’s axes of tension (representation, rationalisation, power) provide a three 
dimensional representation that is applied within each of the three tiers of the institutional 
framework.  Rationality encompasses legitimating grounds, while representational schema 
are the symbolic constructs underpinning actors’ ‘stocks of knowledge’ and understandings.  
Power relations are important in interactions within and between the various levels.  Weber’s 
conceptions of formal versus substantive rationality and subjective versus objective 
representations offer ‘axes of tension’ to contrast the implications of alternative approaches to 
performance measurement and regulation.  Broadbent and Laughlin (2009) suggest that a 
PMS based on formal, rather than substantive rationality and objective rather than subjective 
representations is less likely to be meaningful to the actors subject to it, and so the potential 
for dysfunctional consequences is greater.  
This study of the NHS examines the role of the Department of Health and regulatory bodies 
at institutional level, the Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) 
at the organisational field level and the NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts (FTs) at the 
organisational level.  It also considers the changes made in the recent past and those to take 
place in the near future at the various levels in order to investigate whether axes of tension 
exist, which may provide the potential for contradictions to arise as understandings of the 
meaning of assuring ‘quality of healthcare’ are reconstructed.    
Power (2007) discusses the centrality of ‘infrastructures of referentiality’ as the prevailing 
trends of audit and inspection in public services require that service attributes are rendered 
auditable.  Well-governed organisations become synonymous with auditable organisations.  
He raises the concern that these infrastructures become increasingly self-referential, as the 
need to be auditable constructs the conception of what are the important attributes of services.  
Espeland and Sauder (2007) discuss ‘commensuration’ as one mechanism that induces 
reactivity, a change of behaviour in response to being evaluated, observed or measured.   
They emphasise the importance of agency and of making more explicit how actors make 
discourse meaningful in ways that shape their behaviour.  Commensuration is characterised 
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by the transformation of qualities into quantities that share a metric, a process fundamental to 
measurement.  This process shapes what we pay attention to, the connections between things, 
both creating and obscuring relations among entities.  It decontextualises knowledge, so that 
meaning can be recreated and reinterpreted, and new understandings of accountability can 
emerge.    
These insights are important in understanding and analysing the developments in New Public 
Management generally and in UK healthcare particularly in recent years.  The 
commensuration of healthcare to render it amenable to inspection and measurement has been 
characterised by a proliferation of regulatory and performance measurement bodies, and a 
plethora of mainly quantitative measures, which seek to report on and compare performance 
of hospitals.   
The paper outlines the regulatory bodies and their approaches to performance measurement in 
recent years.  It discusses some of the dysfunctional consequences of the approach with 
reference to events at one particular English hospital where the quest to meet targets and 
achieve desirable ‘Foundation Trust’ status resulted in appalling standards of care for  
patients, some of whom died unnecessarily.  The paper then considers plans for the future and 
possible implications as yet a new set of regulatory bodies and approaches to control seek to 
provide new visibilities and understandings as a competitive market for healthcare is more 
fully developed.    
 
4. Regulatory bodies 
Institutional level 
The story of regulation and performance measurement in healthcare over the last decade or so 
has been one of multiple bodies, sometimes conflicting and unclear responsibilities and 
accountabilities, reformed frequently and with changing remits. 
Under the NHS 2006 Act the Department of Health (DoH) has ultimate responsibility and 
accountability to Parliament for the promotion of a comprehensive healthcare service in the 
UK.  Its duties are delegated to an intermediate tier of management, including Strategic 
Health Authorities (SHAs) and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), and it has also put in place a 
range of regulatory bodies.  Its approach has been one of conflicting policy actions which in 
some cases have sought to devolve power and to decentralise and remove itself from direct 
decision-making, while on the other hand to centralise power through increasingly tight 
management of performance through targets and other measures.  According to Walshe 
(2011): 
I think most commentators would say that between 1997 and 2002/2003, the NHS was increasingly centralised and power 
was exercised much more from the Department of Health, than it had been in the past, before 1997. From 2003 onwards, 
government adopted a series of changes, the creation of foundation trusts, policy on patient choice, policy on payment by 
results and the way in which organisations were reimbursed or funded for the care they provided, which – the introduction 
of an increasing role for non-NHS healthcare providers in the independent sector, all of 
those things spoke to a desire to create a much more diverse, plural and decentralised healthcare system in 
which the Department of Health would not performance  manage every healthcare provider. So there are two 
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slightly contradictory, if you like, lines in policy development. 
 
Furthermore the distinctions between regulatory and performance management activities are 
often unclear and / or overlap in the same organisations.   There is not always a clear third 
party relationship, as opposed to a hierarchical relationship, for regulation as opposed to 
performance management, accountabilities can be confused and confusing and sometimes 
lead to a ‘form of hybrid regulation alongside performance management in place’ (Walshe, 
2011). 
The main national regulatory bodies which have existed over the last ten years are explained 
now, and the regional bodies are discussed in the next section.   
The Commission for Healthcare Inspection (CHI) was set up in 1999 following a public 
inquiry into a scandal relating to paediatric cardiac care in one English hospital.  Its remit was 
mainly the review of clinical governance, defined as:  
‘..a framework through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously 
improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care by creating 
an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish.’  (Department of Health, 
1998). 
Under the NHS Plan (DoH 2000) it was also given responsibility for leading the collation and 
publication of performance assessment data, in collaboration with the DoH and the Audit 
Commission.    
In 2002, the government announced plans to reform health and social care regulation with the 
creation of two new ‘super regulators’, firstly the Commission for Health Audit and 
Inspection (CHAI) to regulate all healthcare provision, and secondly the Commission for 
Social Care Inspection (CSCI) to regulate all social care.  The CHAI, established in 2003 and 
subsequently known as the Healthcare Commission (HC), took over all responsibilities of 
CHI, private healthcare regulation functions which were previously the remit of NCSC and 
also the VFM audit function of the Audit Commission.  It regulated around 582 NHS Trusts. 
In April 2005, just over a year after the setting up of HC, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
announced extensive reform of public service regulation and inspection, and a significant 
reduction in the number of regulatory bodies. The decision was taken to set up the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC) to take over the roles of HC, CSCI and Mental Health Act 
Commission.  CQC was established in 2009, with a budget of £164 million (significantly less 
than the combined budgets of its three predecessors), and tasked with wide-ranging and 
diverse responsibilities.  In 2010 the coalition government launched the new programme of 
reform in the White Paper ‘Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS’, with further changes 
announced for the role of the CQC and healthcare regulation.  It is also responsible for a new 
system of registration of healthcare providers, a massive job in itself, which has consumed a 
large proportion of its resources to date.   
 
Another regulatory body, Monitor, was set up in 2004, whose remit was to oversee newly-
established Foundation Trust (FT) hospitals (FTs are discussed further below).  Monitor 
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evaluates applications for FT status and also regulates these hospitals.  Its authorisation 
process assesses their governance and leadership, as well as their financial viability and 
robustness.  Once established FTs are regulated by Monitor, which requires regular 
performance reports from them, and has extensive powers to intervene if problems arise. 
 
In spite of, or perhaps because of, the many bodies involved and frequently changing 
oversight and performance evaluation arrangements, relatively little power to effect change 
was transferred into the hands of the regulators along with their many responsibilities. 
Newdick and Smith (2010), in concluding their report on the organisation and structure of the 
NHS, state: 
‘As expert witnesses with extensive experience of working within and alongside the NHS, the 
discipline of revisiting numerous policy documents promising significant change as a result 
of new management arrangements has left us chastened as we sought to document, explain 
and understand the apparently relentless ‘redisorganisation’ to which the NHS is subject.’ 
(p.49) 
 
Organisational field level 
The Secretary of State for Health’s duty under s.1 of the 2006 Act is delegated to SHAs, who 
are effectively the regional HQs of the DoH.  They assist the development of local strategies 
to achieve central targets and objectives and monitor compliance with guidance from bodies 
such as CQC.  The ‘operational’ duties under s.3 of the Act are delegated to PCTs, who are 
required to commission healthcare services from a range of providers, including GPs, 
hospitals, dentists, etc.. 
In 2001, Shifting the Balance of Power was published, creating 303 PCTs and 28 Strategic 
Health Authorities and four regional directors of health and social care.  This reduced to 150 
PCTs and 10 SHAs from 2006.  In 2011 SHAs were reduced to 4 and PCTs to 50 ‘clusters’.   
They are to be abolished completely from 2013 and replaced by Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs) and the NHS Commissioning Board. 
 
Organisational level 
There are currently two types of NHS hospitals, NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts, with the 
latter having much greater independence than the former.   
NHS Trusts are hospitals which were established as self-governing bodies with limited 
freedoms to provide services to Health Authority purchasers, as part of the 
purchaser/provider split.  They are subject to direction by the DoH, must not exceed their 
financial allocations and are required to submit regular comparative performance data which 
enables them to be assessed against other hospitals.   
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Legislation to allow for the setting up of Foundation Trust hospitals was passed in 2003.  
These bodies are set up as ‘public benefit corporations’, a sort of halfway house between 
public and private sectors,  and have greater autonomy and flexibility than NHS Trusts, being 
run by a Board of Governors and not subject to statutory powers of direction of the Secretary 
of State for Health.  They have greater independence and powers to define their own 
constitutional and governance arrangements, to borrow money and to hold assets, including 
retaining surpluses from operations. 
In order to attain FT status, a NHS Trust must meet specified standards of performance as 
judged by prevailing performance measurement metrics, discussed further in the next section.  
By 2014 the government intends that all remaining NHS Trusts should have acquired FT 
status. 
 
5. Performance management frameworks 
The regulatory bodies discussed above used several different frameworks to assess 
performance over time.  Given the amount of change in just over a decade, documented 
above, it is perhaps unsurprising to learn that these numerous, short-lived bodies did not 
always have clear remits, responsibilities or accountabilities. Furthermore, their authority to 
act where problems arose was often severely limited.   
Star ratings, Annual Health Check, National Outcomes Framework 
The annual performance ratings for NHS Trusts, known as ‘star ratings’, were introduced in 
2001 (DoH, 2001).  Responsibility for them was taken over by the HC from 2003.  The 
system ostensibly included measures to assess both cost and quality, and incorporated 
rewards and sanctions, including the threat of ‘naming and shaming’, by awarding Trusts a 
rating of between 0 and 3 stars, depending on their achievement of certain targets.  In order to 
be considered for award of coveted FT status, the initial requirement was that a Trust had to 
achieve a 3 star rating.  Where a rating of 0 stars occurred, Trusts were in danger of having 
management removed and replaced, if major improvements were not demonstrated within a 
short time period.  The star ratings system was apparently intended to balance measures of 
efficiency and quality, and to reward those hospitals that achieved excellent results across the 
range of measures.  The system incorporated two elements, a number of key national targets 
and a range of balanced scorecard (BSC) indicators.  The former included maintenance of 
financial stability and a range of other measures, many of which related to patient waiting 
times for different types of treatment.  Reduction of waiting times was a key pledge of the 
Labour government in its election manifesto, as these had been a political ‘hot potato’ for 
many years.  The BSC indicators related more to quality, and included clinical, capacity & 
capability and staff measures. On closer examination, though, even these incorporate very 
little focus on clinical standards, and waiting times again feature strongly.  According to 
Chang (2009) the key targets were classified as ‘must dos’ and a hospital could receive 2 
stars provided it achieved the key targets, even if it missed most of the BSC indicators.  
Conversely a Trust could receive a zero star rating if it failed 2 to 3 key targets significantly, 
regardless of how well it performed on BSC indicators.   
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The ‘Annual Health Check’ (a system based mainly on self-assessment by Trusts) replaced 
star ratings in 2005, after criticisms that the latter were too onerous and targets driven. Key 
performance indicators remained a crucial aspect of the new system, however.  This was 
superseded by the National Outcomes Framework from 2009, which attempted to address the 
criticism that previous PMSs were too focussed on quantitative targets rather than health 
outcomes for patients.  
 
6. The case of Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust 
The consequences of the limitations of the regulatory system are clearly apparent in the case 
of Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust, where an HC investigation uncovered ‘appalling standards 
of care’, and high numbers of unnecessary deaths.  The investigation was triggered by 
unexpectedly high mortality statistics reported by an independent body, Dr Fosters, which 
monitors these statistics nationally.  The findings of the HCC inquiry paint a picture of a 
Trust Board more focussed on attaining FT status, and achieving the necessary targets and 
cost savings to make that possible, than on patient care.  It also reveals regulatory bodies 
whose activities were not sufficiently rigorous or synchronised to identify warning signs or to 
follow up reports of negligent care, of which there were many over several years.  It also 
revealed the shortcomings in specifying adequately the responsibilities of the various 
regulators, and their lack of communication on key issues.  
The trust was granted foundation trust status from February 2008 by Monitor, after a process 
that had begun some three years previously, and the history of the application detailed in the 
public inquiry (www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com) is an interesting one.  In 2002/2003 the 
Commission for Health Improvement had granted the trust three stars in its rating system.  In 
2003 to 2004 the trust received zero stars in the HCC's annual star rating. In 2004/2005 the 
HCC gave it one star.  In February of 2004, the trust produced a document entitled "NHS 
foundation trust consultation document".  In the foreword, the then chief executive, David 
O'Neill, said this: 
 
"Mid Staffordshire General Hospitals NHS Trust has performed extremely well over the past few years and 
continues to deliver high quality patient services, reassured against high clinical standards and national 
performance targets. We believe that NHS foundation trust status is the right way forward ... It will give 
us the opportunity to become more closely aligned to the needs of the local community and the freedom to make 
our own decisions more quickly." 
 
In 2005 the Shropshire and Staffordshire Strategic Health Authority, SASSHA, suggested 
that the trust was two years away from foundation trust status, particularly bearing in mind 
that it had received a one star rating from the HCC.  In 2004/2005 the trust had a financial 
deficit of GBP 2.15 million.  In October 2005 the trust predicted a deficit of 2 million. In fact, 
it achieved a surplus of GBP 500,000.  In December 2005 the trust established a committee to 
ensure that it achieved foundation trust status.  
 
In January 2006 a peer review of the trust standards for the care of the critically ill and 
injured children identified a number of concerns. A letter was sent to the trust identifying a 
number of immediate risks to clinical safety and outcomes. The letter specifically identified 
as a serious problem the lack of senior medical and nurse cover.  In April 2006 it was 
announced at a board meeting that the trust faced a shortfall in funding from the SHA of GBP 
10 million. The trust initiated action to save money by removing beds, reconfiguring the 
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wards and losing 150 posts. In June 2006 the board noted that the surplus at the end of the 
2005/2006 financial year was an excellent outcome, particularly leading up to the application 
for foundation trust status. Also in June 2006 the SHA confirmed its support for the trust's 
application for FT status be made in November 2007, but the Strategic Health Authority 
feedback to the trust about its performance was based solely on Monitor's and the HCC's 
measurements. The support was given despite the adverse peer review in January of the same 
year, six months previously.  In November 2006 the board was informed that the trust was in 
line to deliver GBP 10 million in savings in 2006 to 2007. The 2005 to 2006 the rating given 
by the HCC under the new system they had adopted was "Fair/Fair", representing quality of 
service and use of resources.  In February 2007 the trust chief executive and chair made a 
presentation to the Stafford Oversight and Scrutiny Committee, after which the OSC 
supported the trust's application for FT status. 
 
In May 2007 the HCC report of the patient survey placed the trust in the worst 20 per cent of 
trusts nationwide in a number of areas of care, particularly patient care, hygiene and dignity.  
Through 2007 there was constant focus on the finances of the trust, on saving money and 
increasing the surplus to try to meet Monitor's financial requirements for FT status. There 
was concern expressed at board level about the Dr Foster mortality rates and that the trust 
was performing very poorly in the national survey of patients. But there was no action plan to 
increase the number of nurses, nor to examine the causes underlying these problems. The 
2006/2007 HCC rating was "Fair/Weak", against quality of services and use of resources. In 
October/November 2007 the HCC mortality outliers team generated 11 alerts for the trust. 
Also in October 2007 Monitor made three visits to the trust, in which key risks were 
recorded. 
 
In November/December 2007 the trust submitted its application for foundation trust status. 
Despite the known mortality outliers and the keys risks identified in February 2008, Monitor 
approved the trust's application for FT status, although there was a side letter raising matters 
which had arisen in the assessment, including compliance with targets for A&E, MRSA and 
thrombolysis.  In March 2008, the trust met with the HCC to explain the mortality data and 
the HCC began its investigation. 
 
In explaining to the public inquiry how such a Trust had been awarded FT status, the former 
Chief Executive of HCC said: 
‘I believe that the AHC was some review of trusts’ performance, I believe it had some quality of care in it, but it 
had its limitations….We had to carry out this annual rating.  We sought to broaden that out.  It did not cover all 
of the services or activities that each NHS Trust provided.  That was absolutely impossible.  It did include some 
quality of care measures.’   
Dr Wood, who led the original HCC inquiry and gave evidence to the public inquiry on 10 
May 2011, revealed her unease about AHC ratings being potentially misleading to the public 
in an email to two senior clinical advisors to the HCC in October 2008…It was ‘a case of the 
Emperor’s new clothes’, she said, because ‘we may describe one of the ratings as measuring 
‘quality of care’ but it doesn’t do what it says on the tin’.  
In other evidence, Stephen Hay, Monitor’s chief operating officer, admitted that it did not 
have a ‘systematic, robust approach to assessing clinical governance’ of the hospitals it was 
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responsible for.  He said he believed there was confusion over whose job it was – Monitor’s 
or HCC’s to look at how the boards of FTs measured the quality of care they were providing. 
He accepted that in 2007 Monitor placed insufficient emphasis on clinical, or quality, 
governance in its assessment process.  Monitor was ‘heavily reliant’ on the HCC’s 
assessment of a trust in terms of quality of care provided.  He added that: 
‘Until we learned the lessons from the failings at the Trust, I do not think it was clear  either to us or to the HCC 
which of us was looking at the way in which the boards of foundation trusts assured themselves of the quality of 
care they provided.  This is an issue we have now addressed.’  
 
7. Axes of tension 
The foregoing highlights ‘axes of tension’ that have arisen as a result of developments in  
NHS regulatory bodies and performance measurement frameworks (see Table 1 below).   
 
Table 1: NHS Regulatory Framework: Axes of tension 
Cost / Quality 
Corporate / Clinical Governance 
Policy Evaluation / Performance Measurement 
Transparency / Opacity 
Outcomes/ Systems and Processes 
Devolving / Centralising Power 
 
There is a fundamental tension between controlling / reducing costs, making service 
provision more cost effective, while at the same time maintaining/ improving quality of care. 
The PMS was focussed on quantitative measures, even to assess quality, so many so-called 
measures of quality were in fact proxies based on waiting times for access to services.  As the 
literature suggests, and as the evidence from Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust reveals, such 
commensuration is likely to change the behaviour of those being measured, towards a focus 
on what is being measured rather than the underlying rationale of improving patient care so 
that it is both timely and effective.    
In assessing Trusts’ suitability for coveted FT status, Monitor’s focus has been on corporate 
rather than clinical governance.  The Mid Staffordshire case revealed the impact of this on 
one organisation where the Board were so intent on proving their capabilities in the former 
that they completely marginalised the latter.  The minutes of Board meetings showed an 
inordinate amount of time devoted to matters such as outsourcing the laundry service, while 
clinical governance issues merited only a few lines.   
There has been a huge amount of change in the NHS, but very little attempt to evaluate 
policies before making changes.  The focus has been rather on organisational performance 
measurement.  Talbot (2010) suggests that evaluation has always been an under-developed 
part of the British policy system.  Again, a policy evaluation process would have a more 
qualitative focus, while performance measurement retains a more quantitative focus. 
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While ostensibly PMS and regulation are making organisations more transparent and 
accountable, paradoxically they often have the result of making the inner workings of 
organisations more opaque and less visible, given the way in which they redefine and re-
inscribe what really counts. 
Regulation has tended to focus increasingly on systems and processes, rather than outcomes.  
Rather than more surveillance and direct inspection, the focus turns to ‘control of control’, 
assuring the quality of the control system, rather than first order operations. 
While government has increasingly delegated responsibility for regulation and performance 
measurement, at the same time it has retained the authority to take action.  The distinction 
between performance measurement and regulation has become blurred due to two opposing 
tendencies in government – the competing pressures to devolve on one hand the 
responsibility for providing public services, while at the same time equally powerful 
pressures exist to retain control over functions that have been made autonomous, so e.g. 
nationalised industries were privatised, but then subject to increasingly intensive regulation.  
In healthcare, internal markets were introduced to split the purchaser and provider roles in 
health services, then government required a range of regulatory bodies to devise PMS and 
oversee and monitor performance. 
 
8. The future for healthcare  
The discussion above is of particular concern given the government’s plans for the future of 
healthcare, recently enshrined in legislation (NHS Health and Social Care Act, 2012) after 
much debate and amendment.  In July 2011 the coalition government published its proposals 
for the futures of the NHS in a White Paper entitled ‘Equity and Excellence, Liberating the 
NHS’. The proposals were wide-ranging and dramatic for the structure of the National Health 
Service. As the name of the White Paper suggests, the proposals are founded upon the belief 
that "liberating the NHS" from bureaucratic top-down control and putting power in the hands 
of patients and healthcare professionals are the central means of producing excellent service 
and best practice.  The White Paper stated: 
 
"Current statutory arrangements allow the Secretary of State a large amount of discretion to micromanage 
parts of the NHS. We will be clear about what the NHS should achieve; we will not prescribe how it should be 
achieved. We will legislate to establish more autonomous NHS institutions, with greater freedoms, clear duties, 
and transparency in their responsibilities to patients and their accountabilities….In the future performance will 
be driven by patient choice and commissioning." 
 
The new legislation, therefore, seeks to push through to their conclusion the market-based 
reforms of the NHS that had been only partially completed by the previous Labour 
government. Patients should have greater freedom to choose where and from whom they are 
provided care.  Meanwhile, the top-heavy bureaucracy of the strategic health authorities and 
primary care trusts would be radically cut.  Services will be commissioned at a local level by 
GP practice-based commissioners responding to local patient needs. All acute hospital trusts 
will become foundation trusts, as it is claimed that with greater autonomy they can respond to 
consumer demand, to innovate and excel and be rewarded for it.      
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The role of Monitor is to be extended to being the sector (economic) regulator for the whole 
of the healthcare market in England under a model with its origins in UK utility regulation.   
David Bennett, the new chairman of Monitor, who had been a senior partner at McKinsey 
and head of the Downing Street policy directorate and strategy unit under Tony Blair, caused 
a storm when he gave an interview to The Times in which he described the regulator’s new 
role in promoting competition: 
“We did it in gas, we did it in power, we did it in telecoms.  We’ve done it in rail, we’ve done it in water. So 
there is actually 20 years’ experience of taking monopolistic, monolithic markets and providers and exposing 
them to economic regulation. How can you compare buying electricity with buying healthcare services? Of 
course they are different…. I would say there are important similarities and that’s what convinces me that 
choice and competition will work in the NHS as they did in those other sectors”. 
 
Following the uproar which greeted the new proposals, Monitor’s remit was subsequently 
amended, as the government back-pedalled on the duty to promote competition, and 
announced that competition would be based on quality, not price.  Its responsibilities include 
price setting, tackling anti-competitive behaviour and ensuring continuity of essential 
services in the event of provider financial failure.  It will continue to be responsible for the 
authorisation of FTs until 2014 – the deadline by which all NHS Trusts must become FTs, 
and it will also retain oversight of FTs until 2016.  It will acquire from DoH the responsibility 
for setting national tariffs to reimburse NHS and other providers for their services, although 
responsibility for the overall design and structure of the tariffs will rest with the NHS 
Commissioning Board.  It will have to act to prevent anti-competitive behaviour not in the 
interests of patients and will also be required to support the delivery of integrated services 
where this would improve quality of care or reduce inequalities in access or outcomes.  This 
represents a considerable dilution of the initial proposals to allow ‘all willing providers’ to 
enter the market in order to ‘promote competition’, and seems likely to make regulation even 
more complex given the tension between the need for transparent pricing to enhance 
competition and the need to retain some integrated services.  These amendments recognise 
that for some complex illnesses concentration of treatment into e.g. regional centres of 
excellence makes more sense than having the service provided in every local hospital.  There 
may be potential for competition for the market, rather than within the market, in such 
situations.   
There are considerable challenges relating to designing appropriate tariffs, not least obtaining 
reliable cost data from providers.  As there is the possibility of Trusts being monopoly 
providers of some services but in competition to provide other services, there is an important 
issue of transparency of costs to avoid potential cross-subsidy of services, by manipulating 
allocations of fixed costs of shared services to offer lower prices on competitive services.  
Monitor has commissioned PwC to carry out a major investigation of NHS costing and so far 
they have found many poorly developed costing systems in Trusts.  The Audit Commission 
has also said that the quality of costing information in many Trusts is poor, in spite of around 
fifteen years’ experience of developing reference costs which are used in the Payments by 
Results system of allocating funds to hospitals on the basis of standard payments for actual 
activity carried out.  Reference costs are based on Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) 
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which group together similar procedures for costing purposes.  The development of patient-
level costing systems (PLICS) is in its infancy. 
Dixon et al (2011) discuss some of the challenges likely to be faced in the future, arising out 
of far greater complexities in health as compared to utility markets.   The NHS is 
characterised by many providers offering a vast range of different services.  Healthcare is 
paid for from general taxation and the majority of provision is in the public sector.  The 
complex role of GPs as advisers, providers and commissioners is unique.  Quality is of course 
much harder to assess, making it harder for regulators to monitor and for users to make 
informed choices.  The tension between competitive and integrated services is more acute in 
the health sector.  They suggest that increasing the role of regulation in healthcare offers 
additional mechanisms to shape the behaviour of providers, such as commissioning and 
performance management.  In some cases the creation of markets in the utilities has led to an 
increase in regulation – the initial expectation of short-term regulation to oversee the 
introduction of competition proved to be very wrong.  It is likely that the duties of the 
regulator will be extended as new and unforeseen problems arise.     
The quality/cost trade-off will be of central importance, and this currently sits at the 
intersection of NICE’s standard setting, CQC’s quality assessment and Monitor’s price 
setting.  It is not yet clear how these cross-regulator issues will be dealt with.  A further issue 
in relation to quality is how to ensure patients can make an informed choice as to which 
provider offers the best quality of service for their needs.  One development which has 
attempted to address this issue has been the requirement since 2010 for preparation of 
‘quality accounts’, annual reports to the public made by providers of NHS healthcare about 
the quality of their services.  In the White Paper Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS 
(DoH, 2010) the government stated its intention to use quality accounts ‘to reinforce local 
accountability for performance, encourage peer competition, and provide a clear spur for 
boards of provider organisations to focus on improving outcomes’ (p.14). The requirement to 
publish quality accounts applies to all providers of NHS healthcare services (excluding 
primary care and community services).  Their primary purpose is to encourage Boards to 
report on the quality of their services and their plans from improvement.   Foot et al (2011) 
point out that their usefulness is limited by the need to achieve these two distinct goals of 
local quality improvement and public accountability.  Providers were asked to present 
qualitative and quantitative information relevant to specific services and specialities, covering 
three areas of quality: clinical effectiveness, patient experience and safety.  They were free to 
select the measures they wished to include in their accounts.  In their review of a large sample 
of the first year’s published quality accounts, Foot et al (2011, p.15) concluded that ‘the 
quality indicators sections are extremely varied in the number and choice of measures, 
statistical rigour, and format and quality of presentation.  This diversity of quantitative 
content, coupled with lack of benchmarking information, means it is not practically possible 
to differentiate quality of care between providers on the basis of their quality accounts’.  
They suggest that a more meaningful and cost-effective way of providing quality accounts 
would be for core quantitative measures of service quality to be gathered and reported from a 
central source to better ensure comparability and public accountability, while allowing 
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organisations to reproduce this information in their individual quality accounts, together with 
other measures relating to local issues and priorities which are a focus for quality 
improvement.  The Audit Commission (2012, p.11) confirms in its report that its review of 
the 2010 quality accounts prepared by FTs identified four main shortcomings including a 
widespread lack of comprehensive systems and controls for compiling quality reports and for 
ensuring data quality, and variation in the interpretation of performance indicators.  They go 
on to say that they had found improvements in the 2011 quality accounts for FTs, but that 
many of the criticisms identified above were applicable to the 2011 quality accounts prepared 
by NHS Trusts which do not have FT status.  (This was related to the fact that the Audit 
Commission were required to give an opinion on FTs’ 2011quality accounts but not on those 
of NHS Trusts for that year.  From 2012, however, the external assurance regimes for both 
types of Trust are to be aligned.)            
In terms of accountability Monitor will remain accountable to Parliament, as the utility 
regulators are, through the relevant select committee – a system which has been criticised as 
unsatisfactory by the House of Lords Select Committee on Regulators (2007), which stated 
that ‘there is a crucial need for greater parliamentary oversight of regulatory bodies’ (p.7).  
Other than in extreme situations, the Secretary of State will not have powers to intervene 
even if Monitor is deemed to be performing badly.  Given the politically sensitive arena, 
though, it may be difficult for the government to stand back, e.g. if a poorly performing 
hospital was about to be closed.  
 
9. Discussion and conclusion 
The frequent changes in regulation, inspection and performance measurement and 
management that have taken place over the last two decades in the NHS have resulted in 
some serious shortcomings in accountability and oversight, resulting in some cases in 
seriously substandard care for patients, and even in unnecessary deaths.  The initial inquiry 
into the case of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust revealed some appalling standards of care, 
and painted a vivid picture of the dysfunctional consequences of ‘meeting the target and 
missing the point’.  The objective of achieving FT status was pursued by the Trust Board 
with almost complete disregard for the negative effects of cost-cutting on standards of care.  
Doctors and nurses felt marginalised and clinical governance matters were not a priority at 
Board meetings.  Regulators were not sufficiently clear about their responsibilities, and thus 
Monitor concentrated on establishing the financial viability of the Trust and its corporate 
governance mechanisms, while assuming it would have heard from HCC if there were any 
problems with quality of care.  HCC meanwhile had published satisfactory ratings shortly 
before an independent body revealed disquieting mortality statistics for the Trust (albeit with 
an asterisk to indicate that the Trust was under investigation).  An initial requirement to 
achieve 3* star rating for financial and quality standards in order to obtain FT status was 
subsequently reduced to 2*, with particular emphasis on financial aspects, as government 
pushed for more FTs to be authorised, and SHAs tried to meet their targets of delivering 
Trusts capable of moving to the new status.  The increasing move to quantification of 
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performance through metrics and targets led to a regime focussed more on remote review of 
box-ticking exercises by HCC and less on direct inspection of standards of clinical 
governance as had been the approach of CHI.  Transparency and accountability appear to 
have been hindered rather than helped by a regime that became more focussed on quantifiable 
metrics and on cost rather than quality.   
While CQC remain responsible for assessing quality of care under the regime, a new world of 
competition and economic regulation is being instituted.  The complexities of the new 
approach can only be guessed at, and many questions remain to be answered, not least how 
quality will be safeguarded, given the shortcomings and inadequate communication between 
regulators to date discussed above. 
Dixon et al (2011) discuss some of the issues the regulator will face and compare these to 
issues faced in utility regulation.  The NHS tariff was originally introduced to support patient 
choice rather than to promote efficiency, but the way it has come to be used – to impose a 
downward pressure on provider costs by reducing the tariff in real terms – means that it has 
similar properties to the RPI–x tariffs in the utility industries as they were originally 
introduced. Despite these similarities, there are also important differences.  It has never 
approached the complexity of the NHS tariff, in which there are several hundred prices for 
individual services (and even this number is achieved only by bundling together similar but 
not identical services). Furthermore, there remain a number of areas such as specialised 
services and community services where suitable tariffs have yet to be devised. The NHS tariff 
has been further complicated by the introduction of incentives in relation to specific 
objectives, e.g. reducing emergency admissions, promoting day surgery and rewarding better 
quality.  Monitor is therefore faced with an extremely difficult and complex task, partly due 
to the heterogeneity of the product (health care), the number of product lines (procedures, 
care bundles, etc) and the potential for cross-subsidy between them, and the information 
available to support Monitor in defining the tariff is limited.  
The language is hard to recognise as belonging to healthcare as we know it in the UK.  In 
addition to a preoccupation with the quantification of metrics to enable regulation by 
inspection (which will continue under CQC’s responsibility for ensuring quality), we also 
now see healthcare subject to further commensuration as a product subject to economic 
regulation like gas and electricity.  Commensuration affects the three dimensions of 
representation, rationality and power. New representations of organisational purpose have the 
objective characteristics informed by infrastructures of referentiality, rather than the more 
subjective understandings of patient care that traditionally informed hospital life and the 
provision of healthcare.  As commensuration reconstructs accountability, it gives rise to new 
conceptions of rationality.  Legitimating grounds for organisational activity come to be based 
on formal rather than substantive rationality, as quantifiable, auditable measures of healthcare 
become the focus of attention and the measures which define success or failure.  The power 
to make decisions and control resources shifts, too, as more qualitative clinical governance 
becomes subservient to more quantitative corporate governance.  The influence of 
commensuration on PMS and regulation in healthcare are very apparent in developments over 
the last fifteen years or so, and look set to become even more pronounced as economic 
regulation and a competitive market in healthcare are pursued in the future.  As Espeland and 
Sauder (2007) say: 
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‘Once accountability is understood quantitatively and is equated with good governance, the meanings of many 
core values – efficiency, improvement, transparency, responsiveness, etc. – are redefined and reinscribed in our 
institutions as technical rather than political accomplishments.’   
Meanwhile, as Lord Darzi, the former Labour health minister, was to put it:  
“We now have health and wellbeing boards, clinical commissioning groups, clinical senates, local 
healthwatches, the NHS commissioning board, a quality regulator and an economic regulator … At the end of 
the day, who is responsible for making sure that the NHS saves more lives this year than last? 
Who is accountable for how its budget is spent? Who will inspire NHS staff to lead the 
difficult changes?” 
 
Power (1994) suggests an alternative model of control and accountability based more on 
qualitative measures, local methods, high trust and public dialogue, rather than the current 
predisposition for quantitative measures, external agencies, low trust and private experts.  
Given the evidence discussed above of the results to date of the latter approach, might the 
former offer us possibilities for a better way of ensuring we provide better quality healthcare 
for the population, rather than one based on the model of utility regulation?     
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